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of incomplete information allows the treaty to become successful under larger set of parameter
conditions than under complete information. The paper also examines the welfare properties
of our equilibrium results, showing a welfare improvement relative to complete information
under certain conditions. Finally, we extend our analysis to settings where countries￿types are
correlated, ￿nding that the equilibrium outcome where information is conveyed can be supported
under larger conditions.
Keywords: Signaling games; Information transmission; Non-binding negotiations; Corre-
lated types.
JEL classification: C72, D62, Q28.
￿Address: 111C Hulbert Hall, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164. E-mail: anaespinola@wsu.edu.
yAddress: 103G Hulbert Hall, Washington State University. Pullman, WA 99164-6210. E-mail: fmunoz@wsu.edu.
Phone: (509) 335 8402. Fax: (509) 335 1173.
11 Introduction
The United States leading role in the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference raised
questions about the U.S. true commitment to the content of the agreement. On one hand, the then-
recent election of President Obama led many countries to speculate that the U.S. environmental
agenda could experience a change of course, relative to the previous administration, given the
strong emphasis on environmental issues by the Obama￿ s presidential campaign.1 On the other
hand, several specialists questioned the U.S. commitment on the grounds that it did not ratify
the Kyoto￿ s protocol and the current di¢ culty of passing a climate change bill through a reluctant
Senate.2 A similar concern was raised about China￿ s true commitment to environmental policies.
Speci￿cally, China￿ s President Hu Jintao promised a 40-45 percent cut in emissions by 2020, but did
not agree to outside veri￿cation, leading many observers to express their skepticism about China￿ s
ful￿llment of its promises.3
Besides environmental treaties, noncompliance has also been observed in other international
agreements. For instance, in the context of trade agreements, Busch and Reinhardt (2003) found
that from 1948 to 2002 the U.S. faced 193 disputes in the GATT/WTO, where 56 rulings were
against this country, indicating that the U.S. did not comply with some requirements of the treaty.
Noncompliance has additionally been documented in security agreements, Martin (2005). For
example, the U.S. has maintained a large-scale development of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs)
despite of its 1972 ABMs Treaty with the Soviet Union, where both countries agreed to limit the
construction of ABM installations. Similarly, the U.S. signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 during the Clinton administration, but afterwards it was not rati￿ed by a
Republican dominated Senate in 1999.4;5
Countries, hence, frequently face uncertainty about whether or not the content of the agreement
will be respected by other signatories. In order to model this information setting, our paper
considers a bilateral negotiation where the representatives of both countries are privately informed
about their own type, where countries￿types capture any underlying characteristic a⁄ecting their
political ability to comply with the terms of the treaty. Speci￿cally, when the type of a country￿ s
representative is ￿high,￿he complies with the content of the agreement since he has the political
1For instance, PolitiFact.com tracked over 53 di⁄erent promises related to environmental and energy issues during
the Obama campaign.
2During the Copenhagen summit Sweden￿ s minister of environment, Andreas Carlgren, was one of the leaders
expressing his worries about the U.S. willingness to commit to policies curving global warming; as reported in the
New York Times, December 26, 2009. In this line, according to Schreurs et. al. (2009), pp. 8-9, the U.S. signed nine
environmental treaties over the past 30 years, but they did not receive enough votes for Senate rati￿cation.
3As reported in the New York Times last November 26, 2009.
4Most senators voted along party lines, with 92 percent of Republican senators voting against the treaty, and 100
percent of Democrats voting in favor. For more details, see U.S. Senate Rollcall Vote No. 325 (October 13, 1999).
5Examples abound of treaties signed by a country but subsequently not rati￿ed by its Senate. For instance, the
U.S. played a leading role and signed the League of Nations of 1919 but, due to opposition in its Senate, never rati￿ed
the Covenant. Likewise, the U.S. signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1994 but
did not ratify it either. Finally, 20 E.U. states signed the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
in 1997-98, but it has not yet been rati￿ed by Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Poland
and Sweden; as documented by the Council of Europe (see Concil of Europe Treaty Series No. 164).
2power, both within his party and the Congress, to implement the treaty. In contrast, when the
type of the country￿ s representative is ￿low,￿he lacks such political power and, therefore, does not
fully comply with the terms of the agreement. A representative￿ s political ability to fully comply
with the content of the agreement is unobservable by representatives from other countries. Indeed,
a country￿ s o¢ cial can approximately estimate other o¢ cials￿domestic political power. Yet, he
cannot perfectly assess the relationships these o¢ cials maintain across party lines, or other informal
associations between the main political parties, which ultimately a⁄ect the posterior implementation
of the agreement. Finally, since our model allows for both countries to be uninformed about each
others￿types, the paper also embodies standard signaling games with one-sided uncertainty as
special cases, as well as negotiation games with perfectly informed players.
The paper analyzes a signaling game where the country leading the negotiation decides whether
to participate in the agreement and, conditional on the leader￿ s signature, the following country
chooses whether to join the treaty. We ￿rst identify a fully informative separating equilibrium,
where only the high-type leader signs the agreement, thereby conveying its political ability to the
uninformed follower, which responds joining the treaty regardless of its type. Moreover, a pooling
equilibrium emerges where information about the leader￿ s type is concealed from the follower. This
equilibrium can be sustained if both leader￿ s and follower￿ s priors are su¢ ciently high and, therefore,
both countries sign regardless of their types. For instance, Japan￿ s participation in international
whaling agreements might be explained by this equilibrium prediction. Despite its previous history,
Japan led the negotiations of a bilateral agreement with the U.S. by which Japan committed in
1984 to end all whaling by 1988. However, Japan continued its whaling practices afterwards,
claiming such whaling was ￿research￿oriented, and hence allowed under the International Whaling
Commission￿ s rules.6
In addition to these two pure-strategy equilibria, we also describe under which conditions a semi-
separating equilibrium arises where both countries randomize their participation decision. Hence,
relative to a complete information benchmark, whereby the agreement is only successful when the
leader￿ s type is high, our equilibrium results suggest that treaties become successful under condi-
tions for which the agreement would not be signed in complete information contexts. Thus, the
presence of incomplete information, rather than hindering the chances of a successful agreement,
can actually promote its signature.7
We then examine the welfare properties of our equilibrium results. In particular, we demonstrate
that, when the type of at least one of the countries involved in the negotiations is high, social
welfare in the pooling equilibrium ￿ where both countries sign￿ is weakly larger than under any
of the other equilibrium outcomes, where either: only one type of leader participates (as in the
separating equilibrium), or the leader randomizes its participation decision (as in the semiseparating
equilibrium). In contrast, when both countries￿types are low, the no signature of the agreement
prescribed in the separating equilibrium yields a larger social welfare. Therefore, from a policy
6For more details on this whaling agreement, among others, see Stoett (1997).
7This result is in the line with Young (1991), as opposed to Keohane (1984) who argues that more information
facilitates international cooperation.
3perspective, our results suggest that international organizations should favor negotiations where
at least one country has a relatively consistent history of compliance with the content of similar
treaties. We also compare social welfare under complete and incomplete information settings.
Speci￿cally, we show that the introduction of incomplete information leads to a welfare improvement
if the type of at least one country is high and, in addition, countries￿priors are relatively symmetric.
Otherwise, uncertainty does not necessarily yield a larger social welfare.
Finally, we investigate how our equilibrium outcomes are a⁄ected by the presence of correlation
in countries￿types. This context might arise when countries share similar institutional settings and
political scenarios, thereby increasing the likelihood that their types coincide. We demonstrate that
positive correlation expands (shrinks) the region of parameter values under which the separating
(pooling, respectively) equilibrium can be supported. Importantly, since the pooling equilibrium
entails a larger social welfare than under complete information, our results suggest that, from a
policy perspective, international conferences should promote settings where countries￿types actually
di⁄er, since they increase the likelihood of a welfare-improving agreement.
Our model can be extended to settings where domestic agents ￿ such as unions, political parties,
etc.￿ negotiate whether to accept an agreement proposed by an independent party, e.g., the
Congressional Budget O¢ ce, and are uncertain about each others￿ability to ful￿ll the content
of the treaty. This paper suggests that the presence of uncertainty into these types of negotiations
can actually entail an increase in the probability that the agreement is successful which, in some
cases, can provide welfare bene￿ts.
Related literature. The literature on international agreements has extensively examined
negotiations under a context of complete information; see Barrett (1994a and 1999) and Cesar
(1994). These studies show that when free-riding incentives are small treaties can be sustained under
larger parameter conditions.8 Several international agreements are, however, usually negotiated in
contexts of incomplete information, like that analyzed in our model. This paper hence contributes
to the literature considering uncertainty in international negotiations, such as Iida (1993), who
analyzes treaties using a repeated bargaining game. Speci￿cally, he assumes that a country is
uninformed about other countries￿domestic constraints, whereas we consider that both countries
are uninformed about each others￿ability to comply with the content of the treaty.9 Martin (2005)
also analyzes the signaling role of the signature of a treaty. Her paper considers two di⁄erent types
of agreements, executive treaties and international agreements, which imply di⁄erent degrees of
compliance. Unlike her study, we investigate the case where not only the follower but also the
8This literature was extended by models allowing countries to impose ￿sanctions￿on defecting countries, Barrett
(1994b), and by studies linking the negotiations of transboundary pollution treaties with other issues such as free-
trade agreements; see Whalley (1991), Carraro and Siniscalco (2001) and Ederington (2002). Fearon (1998) studies a
repeated game where countries, despite being perfectly informed, cannot perfectly detect each others￿defection from
the cooperative agreement.
9Tarar (2001) extends Iida￿ s (1993) model to a setting where the executive of one country in the negotiation observes
both his own domestic constraint and that of the other country. (For similar models on unilateral uncertainty, see
Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia (2011).) Our model, however, considers that both executives are privately
informed about their domestic constraint, and allows for correlation.
4leader is uninformed. Our paper also di⁄ers along several other dimensions: we allow for a more
general payo⁄ structure, provide an analysis of settings where players￿types are correlated, and
compare the welfare properties of di⁄erent information contexts.10
Koremenos (2005) empirically analyzes states￿willingness to participate in binding agreements
when countries can su⁄er future shocks a⁄ecting the bene￿ts of the treaty. She shows that coun-
tries, in order to insure themselves from uncertainty, sign ￿nite duration agreements and include
provisions that allow for future renegotiations.11 Koremenos￿(2005) study contributes to a recent
line of work, often regarded as the ￿rational design￿literature, which examines how institutional
design is a⁄ected by the conditions surrounding the negotiations, such as the availability of infor-
mation and the possibility of monitoring.12 In particular, these studies assume that countries are
uncertain about their own future political or economic scenario, and thus hesitate to participate
in binding agreements. Negotiating countries are therefore exposed to an ex-ante symmetric un-
certainty, in the form of a probabilistic future shock, when deciding whether to sign the treaty. In
contrast, we consider that the uncertainty country representatives face is asymmetric, namely, a
country￿ s executive can accurately assess his own political ability to implement the content of the
treaty, yet cannot correctly estimate the ability of his cosignatories.
The next section describes the model under complete information. Section 3 examines the set
of equilibria when countries are privately informed, their comparative statics and the cases that
arise when only one of the countries is privately informed about its type. Section 4 provides welfare
comparisons. In section 5 we extend our analysis to correlated types and o⁄er policy implications,
and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Let us examine an international treaty as a game where countries￿representatives decide whether
or not to participate in the agreement. The country acting as the leader (country 1) announces
whether it joins the agreement. If the leader signs the treaty, then the follower (country 2) decides
whether or not to sign. The commitment levels speci￿ed in the treaty are non-binding and its
implementation provide bene￿ts to all countries, such as a limit in the production of anti-ballistic
missiles, or the reduction of pollution in an environmental treaty. However, the leader obtains a
larger bene￿t from the treaty than the follower, and hence the former has incentives to carry the
burden of the negotiations. For instance, it is more a⁄ected by environmental pollution, or it is
more threatened by other countries with nuclear capabilities.
In this section, we consider a complete information setting where countries observe each others￿
10In a di⁄erent context, the literature on international trade has recently examined tari⁄agreements where countries
are privately informed, for instance, about the extent to which the import-competing sector of another country is
a⁄ected by an e¢ ciency shock; see Lee (2007), Martin and Vergote (2008) and Bagwell (2009).
11Likewise, Von Stein (2008) empirically studies how the introduction of ￿ exibility provisions in international
environmental agreements a⁄ects their rati￿cation.
12See, among others, Downs et al. (1996), Koremenos (2001), Koremenos et al. (2004), Lake (1999), Rosendor⁄
(2005) and Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992).
5types: high, ￿H, implying that the country has the political ability to comply with the terms of
the treaty; or low, ￿L, which indicates that it behaves as if the treaty was not signed (status quo,
where countries select Nash equilibrium strategies). If the treaty is signed by both countries, it
becomes successful, and a signatory complies with the content of the agreement if its type is high,
whereas it behaves as a non-signatory if its type is low. If either country does not sign the treaty,
it becomes unsuccessful and both countries behave as in the status quo. In particular, let country
i￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ from the leader￿ s signature be represented by ViK(S;sj;￿J), where the ￿rst
term of the subscript denotes the country￿ s position in the negotiation, i = f1;2g; the second term
represents its type, K = fH;Lg; and ￿J denotes the type of country j 6= i, where J = fH;Lg.
In addition, sj = fS;NSg represents the follower￿ s strategy (the signature or not signature of the
treaty, respectively), when the leader signs the agreement. For compactness, let ViK(NS;￿J) denote
country i￿ s payo⁄ in the case that the leader does not sign the agreement, and the follower￿ s action
set is therefore empty.
Leader￿ s payo⁄s. When the ￿rst mover does not participate, the treaty is not success-
ful and its equilibrium payo⁄ is V1K(NS;￿J). When the leader signs the treaty but the fol-
lower responds not participating, the leader￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ becomes V1K(S;NS;￿J). In
this setting, the agreement is still not successful either, and countries￿ actions coincide with
those under no treaty (status quo). Nonetheless, the leader bears a cost from a failed agree-
ment. Hence, if the follower does not participate, the leader prefers not to sign the treaty, i.e.,
V1K(NS;￿J) > V1K(S;NS;￿J), since by not signing the leader avoids any cost from an unsuc-
cessful treaty. When the follower responds joining, the leader￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is V1K(S;S;￿J).
Therefore, BS1K(￿J) ￿ V1K(S;S;￿J) ￿ V1K(NS;￿J) describes the leader￿ s bene￿t from signing a
treaty with a ￿J-type follower. When the leader￿ s type is high, the bene￿ts from the signature
(e.g., improved environmental quality) o⁄set its associated cost, regardless of the follower￿ s type,
i.e., BS1H(￿H) > BS1H(￿L) > 0. In contrast, when the leader￿ s type is low, it prefers to avoid
an agreement with a low-type follower, i.e., BS1L(￿H) > 0 > BS1L(￿L).13 The following example
illustrates these conditions on the leader￿ s payo⁄s in the context of public good games.
Example. Similar to standard public good games, consider that the K-type country payo⁄
function is given by
UK
i (ei;ej) = BenefitK
i (ei;ej) ￿ Costi(ei;￿K) = ln[￿im(ei + ej)] ￿
ei
￿K
, where j 6= i
and ei denotes the e⁄ort that country i = f1;2g exerts implementing the content of the treaty,
e.g., its investment in clean technologies in an environmental agreement, and ￿1 = 2 for the
leader and ￿2 = 1 for the follower. As suggested above, if the K-type leader does not sign the
treaty, the negotiation game ends, and every country i independently and simultaneously solves max
ei
13This indicates that the negotiation cost that the low-type leader must incur outweighs the bene￿ts from signing
a treaty with a low-type follower, since no signatory complies with the content of the agreement, ultimately yielding
a negative bene￿t from the agreement.
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= (￿H;0) when countries￿types do not coincide and the type of
country i 6= j is high. In this context, the leader￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ becomes V1K(NS;￿K) =
ln[2m￿K] ￿ 1
2 when both countries￿type is K = fH;Lg, it is V1H(NS;￿L) = ln[2m￿H] ￿ 1 when
the leader￿ s (follower￿ s) type is high (low, respectively), and V1L(NS;￿H) = ln[2m￿H] if only the
follower￿ s type is high. When the leader signs the treaty but the follower responds not joining,
the treaty is also unsuccessful and each country i solves max
ei
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i (ei;ej) by selecting the Nash
equilibrium, entailing an equilibrium payo⁄ of V1K(S;NS;￿J) = V1K(NS;￿J) ￿ NC, which lies
below V1K(NS;￿J), given that the leader must incur the negotiation cost NC 2 R+. If, instead,
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dependently choose e⁄ort level ￿L







(2￿H;0) when only country i￿ s type is high. In this setting, the leader￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ from
signing the treaty is thus V1H(S;S;￿H) = ln[4m￿H]￿1￿NC when both countries￿types are high,
V1L(S;S;￿L) = ln[2m￿L] ￿ 1
2 ￿ NC when both types are low, V1H(S;S;￿L) = ln[4m￿H] ￿ 2 ￿ NC
if only the leader￿ s type is high, and V1L(S;S;￿H) = ln[4m￿H] ￿ NC if only the follower￿ s type is
high. Therefore, the high-type leader￿ s bene￿t from signing the treaty is BS1H(￿H) = 0:89 ￿ NC
and BS1H(￿L) = 0:39 ￿ NC, i.e., BS1H(￿H) > BS1H(￿L) > 0 if and only if NC < 0:39. By
contrast, the low-type leader￿ s bene￿t is BS1L(￿H) = 0:69 ￿ NC and BS1L(￿L) = ￿NC, i.e.,
BS1L(￿H) > 0 > BS1L(￿L).
Follower￿ s payo⁄s. The K-type follower obtains a payo⁄ V2K(NS;￿J) when the ￿J-type
leader does not participate. If, instead, the leader signs the agreement but the follower responds
not participating, its payo⁄ is V2K(S;NS;￿J). When the follower responds signing the treaty its
payo⁄ becomes V2K(S;S;￿J). Similarly as for the leader￿ s payo⁄, let BS2K(￿J) ￿ V2K(S;S;￿J) ￿
V2K(S;NS;￿J) denote the K-type follower￿ s bene￿t from joining a treaty with a ￿J-type leader.
Assume that the high-type follower￿ s incentives to participate in the agreement are positive when
facing a high-type leader, i.e., BS2H(￿H) > 0, but negative otherwise, BS2H(￿L) < 0. Intuitively,
the high-type follower bene￿ts more from a larger compliance of the treaty when the leader is
also a high-type country than when the leader is not, whereby the ful￿llment of the agreement is
mainly borne by the follower. Furthermore, BS2H(￿L) is negative since the low-type leader does
not comply and, hence, the improvement in the global environmental quality does not compensate
the increase in abatement costs that the follower experiences. When the follower is a low type, it
bene￿ts from participating in a treaty with the high-type leader (where it free-rides the leader￿ s
compliance), i.e., BS2L(￿H) > 0, but does not obtain any bene￿t from signing an agreement with
7the low-type leader, i.e., BS2L(￿L) = 0.14
Example. Following the above example, when the leader does not sign the treaty, the fol-
lower￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is V2K(NS;￿K) = ln[m￿K] ￿ 1
2 if both countries￿types coincide, and
V2H(NS;￿L) = ln[m￿H] ￿ 1 when the follower￿ s (leader￿ s) type is high (low, respectively), and
V2L(NS;￿H) = ln[m￿H] if only the leader￿ s type is high. When the leader signs but the fol-
lower responds not joining, the follower￿ s equilibrium payo⁄is V2K(S;NS;￿J) which coincides with
V2K(NS;￿J). By contrast, if the follower responds joining, the treaty becomes successful, implying
that the follower￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ from signing the treaty is thus V2H(S;S;￿H) = ln[2m￿H] ￿ 1
when both countries￿ types are high, V2L(S;S;￿L) = ln[m￿L] ￿ 1
2 when both types are low,
V2H(S;S;￿L) = ln[2m￿H] ￿ 2 if only the follower￿ s type is high, and V2L(S;S;￿H) = ln[2m￿H]
if only the leader￿ s type is high. Hence, the high-type follower￿ s bene￿t from joining the treaty is
BS2H(￿H) = 0:19 and BS2H(￿L) = ￿0:31, i.e., BS2H(￿H) > 0 > BS2H(￿L). However, the low-type
follower￿ s bene￿t from the agreement is BS2L(￿H) = 0:69 > 0 and BS2L(￿L) = 0.
We next identify the equilibrium strategy in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 1 (Complete information). The leader signs (does not sign) the treaty when its type
is high (low, respectively), regardless of the follower￿ s type. The follower responds joining the treaty
when he observes that a high-type leader participates, but does not sign the agreement otherwise.
Intuitively, the leader anticipates that the follower will only respond joining the treaty when
it observes a signature from a high-type leader. As a consequence, the high-type leader signs the
agreement, whereas the low-type leader does not participate since the follower would respond not
joining it. Therefore, under complete information, the treaty is only successful when the leader￿ s
type is high. In the following section, we investigate if the introduction of incomplete information
about countries￿types allows for the emergence of equilibrium outcomes where countries sign under
conditions for which the treaty would not be successful under complete information, namely, when
the leader￿ s type is low.
3 Signaling game
In this section we consider settings where every country is privately informed about its own type,
but does not observe the other country￿ s type. This case describes strategic contexts where both
leader￿ s and follower￿ s commitment with the agreement is uncertain because, for instance, both
countries have a previous history of irregularly complying with the terms of the treaty, or both
countries have recently elected o¢ cials. Speci￿cally, the time structure of the signaling game is as
follows:
14Note that a negotiation between a low-type leader and follower implies that countries select the same second-
period actions whether or not the treaty is signed (they behave as in the status quo). Hence, the bene￿ts from
participating in the treaty coincide with those of not participating.
81. Nature selects the leader￿ s type, which is privately observed by the leader but not by the
follower. For simplicity, assume that the leader￿ s type is either high, ￿H, or low, ￿L, with
associated probabilities p and 1 ￿ p, respectively. Similarly, nature determines the follower￿ s
type, which is also privately observed by the follower, either high or low, with probabilities q
and 1 ￿ q, respectively.15
2. After observing its type, the leading country announces its participation in the agreement. If
the leader does not sign the treaty, the negotiation ends, and the agreement is unsuccessful,
and every country behaves as in the status quo.
3. After observing the leader￿ s signature, the J-type follower forms posterior beliefs about the
leader￿ s type being high, i.e., ￿J(HjS) where J = fH;Lg.16 Given its posterior beliefs, the
follower chooses to sign or not sign the agreement. If the follower responds not participating,
the negotiation ends.
4. If the treaty is signed by both players, high-type countries fully implement the content of the
agreement, while those with a low type implement the status quo.17
We next study under which conditions the leader￿ s decision to sign the agreement conveys
or conceals information about its type to the follower, thus a⁄ecting the follower￿ s willingness to
participate in the treaty. The following proposition describes the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibria
(PBE) in pure strategies in this signaling game.
Proposition 1. In the signaling game where all countries are uninformed about each oth-
ers￿types, the following equilibria in pure strategies survive the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive
Criterion:
a. A separating equilibrium in which the leader signs (does not sign) the treaty when its type
is high (low, respectively), and the follower responds participating (not participating) after
observing a signature (no signature, respectively), both when its own type is high and low, if
and only if q < qL, where qL ￿
￿BS1L(￿L)
BS1L(￿H)￿BS1L(￿L); and
b. A pooling equilibrium in which both types of leader sign and both types of follower respond
joining the agreement if and only if p ￿ pH and q ￿ qL, where pH ￿
￿BS2H(￿L)
BS2H(￿H)￿BS2H(￿L)
In the separating equilibrium, the follower infers that the leader￿ s type must be high after
observing a signature and responds joining the treaty, irrespective of its own type. This result
15For simplicity, in this section we consider that countries￿types are uncorrelated (i.e., independently distributed),
whereas section 5 examines how our equilibrium results are a⁄ected by the presence of correlated types.
16Note that if, in contrast, the leader announces its non-participation in the treaty, the follower￿ s strategy space
becomes empty, and hence its posterior beliefs are unconsequential.
17We consider that the commitment levels speci￿ed in the treaty are above those in the status quo, implying a
Pareto improvement.
9hence resembles that under complete information, where agreements are only successful when the
leader is a high-type country. Intuitively, the low-type leader is not attracted to participate in the
treaty since the probability of facing a high-type follower (who will respond joining the agreement
in the separating equilibrium) is su¢ ciently low, q < qL. Hence, only the high-type leader signs
the treaty, and such signature conveys its type to the follower, thus inducing it to join. The ￿gure
below represents the set of pure-strategy equilibria described in Proposition 1, where the separating
equilibrium arises when q < qL.18
Figure 1. Pure-strategy PBEs.
The introduction of incomplete information, however, allows for the emergence of an equilibrium
outcome that could not be sustained under complete information contexts. In particular, a pooling
equilibrium is supported where both types of leader sign the agreement and, as a consequence, no
information is conveyed to the follower. Hence, this country must decide whether or not to join
the treaty based on its expected payo⁄, which increases in the probability of facing a high-type
leader, p. Speci￿cally, the follower signs if p is su¢ ciently large, p ￿ pH. Anticipating the follower￿ s
signature, both types of leader participate if the follower￿ s type is likely to be high, i.e., q ￿ qL,
and the treaty is successful.19
The set of parameter values under which the above separating equilibrium can be sustained
depends upon free-riding incentives. In particular, the low-type leader￿ s free-riding incentives are
represented by BS1L(￿H), since this expression re￿ ects the leader￿ s bene￿t from signing an agree-
ment with a high-type follower. When such free-riding incentives decrease, the high-type follower
is more attracted to participate in the agreement, expanding the set of priors, q, under which the
18Note that cuto⁄s pH and qL are both positive and lie below 1=2, as described in the proof of Proposition 1.
19In our above example, cuto⁄ qL becomes qL =
NC
0:69 where NC < 0:39, implying that qL 2 [0;0:55]; while cuto⁄
pH becomes pH = 0:62.
10separating equilibrium can be sustained, i.e., producing an upward shift in cuto⁄ qL of ￿gure 1.
Let us now examine the region of priors supporting the pooling equilibrium. For a given bene￿t
from signing with a low-type leader, BS2H (￿L), an increase in BS2H (￿H) expands the set of priors
under which the follower chooses to sign the agreement in this pooling equilibrium, i.e., produces
a leftward shift in cuto⁄ pH in the above ￿gure. Intuitively, the treaty becomes more attractive
for the follower when the bene￿ts from signing an agreement with a high-type leader increase, thus
inducing the follower to sign.
The previous proposition described the set of equilibria under di⁄erent conditions on the prior
probabilities. However, no equilibrium involving pure strategies exists in the region where p < pH
and q ￿ qL. The following proposition identi￿es an equilibrium under these parameter conditions
in which countries use mixed strategies.
Proposition 2. In the signaling game where all countries are uninformed about each others￿
types, a semiseparating equilibrium can be supported when p < pH and q ￿ qL, where:




1￿pH when its type is low, where pL 2 (0;1), and
signs the treaty with probability one when its type is high, pH = 1; and
2. The follower responds by joining the agreement with probability rH(q) 2 (0;1) when its type
is high, and joining the treaty with probability one when its type is low, rL = 1, where its









where CUT1L(￿J) ￿ V1L(NS;￿J)￿V1L(S;NS;￿J), and BPS1L(￿J) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿J)￿V1L(S;NS;￿J).
Therefore, the agreement is signed by both types of leaders and followers with a strictly positive
probability. This result, combined with those of Proposition 1, predicts that when countries face
uncertainty about each others￿types the treaty becomes successful not only when the leader￿ s type
is high ￿ as in complete information settings￿ but also when its type is low. The following ￿gure
summarizes the equilibrium predictions of Propositions 1a, 1b and 2, spanning all values of priors
p;q 2 [0;1]. In the next corollary, we examine the comparative statics of players￿mixed strategies
in the semiseparating equilibrium.
11Figure 2. Pure- and mixed-strategy PBEs.
Corollary 1. The leader￿ s probability of signing the agreement when its type is low, pL, is: (1)
increasing in the probability of the leader being a high type, p; and (2) increasing in the (negative)
bene￿t that the high-type follower obtains from signing a treaty with a low-type leader, BS2H (￿L).
Furthermore, the follower￿ s probability of signing the treaty, rH(q), is: (1) increasing in the costs
that the low-type leader su⁄ers from an unsuccessful treaty with a high-type follower, CUT1L(￿H) ￿
V1L(NS;￿H) ￿ V1L(S;NS;￿H); and (2) decreasing in the bene￿ts that the low-type leader obtains
from the posterior signature of the treaty by a high-type follower, BPS1L(￿H) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿H) ￿
V1L(S;NS;￿H).
Let us describe the intuition behind the above corollary. First, an increase in the probability of
the leader being a high type raises the follower￿ s incentives to sign the treaty, increasing as a result
the low-type leader￿ s probability to participate in the agreement, pL. Second, an increase in the
(negative) bene￿t that the high-type follower obtains when signing a treaty with a low-type leader
reduces the set of beliefs for which the follower is attracted to respond joining the agreement. Hence,
in order to be perceived as a high-type country, the low-type leader participates in the treaty with
a higher probability, pL. On the other hand, an increase in the costs that the low-type leader faces
when the treaty is unsuccessful makes the signature of the agreement more costly, reducing the
likelihood that a signature originates from a low type. As a consequence, the follower is more likely
to face a high-type leader, raising the probability rH(q) with which the follower joins the treaty. In
contrast, an increase in the bene￿t that the low-type leader obtains from the high-type follower￿ s
posterior signature of the agreement, BPS1L(￿H), raises the leader￿ s incentive to participate in the
treaty. As a result, the likelihood that the follower faces a low-type leader increases, ultimately
reducing the follower￿ s probability of joining the treaty.
12Information transmission. Let us investigate how the parameters of the model a⁄ect the
extent of informativeness of the semiseparating equilibrium. A sensible measure is the di⁄erence
between pH, the probability with which the high-type leader signs the treaty, and pL, the proba-
bility that the low-type leader participates, i.e., pH ￿ pL. A larger discrepancy in the probabilities
of signature by the two types of leader implies that, when a signature is observed, it is more likely
to originate from a high-type leader. On one hand, an increase in the probability of the leader
being high, p, raises pL, reducing the degree of informativeness of the semiseparating equilibrium.
Intuitively, a likely high-type leader makes the treaty more attractive for the follower and, as a con-
sequence, also for the low-type leader, who participates in the agreement with a larger probability
pL.20 Graphically, an increase in p moves our equilibrium predictions, from the semiseparating to
the pooling equilibrium where both types of leader sign; as illustrated by arrow (1) in ￿gure 3. On
the other hand, a decrease in the probability of the follower being high-type, q, increases rH(q). As
a result, both types of follower respond signing the agreement, converging to their behavior in the
separating equilibrium of the game; as represented by arrow (2). Finally, note that the probability
with which both types of leader sign the treaty, pH and pL, is independent of q. Thus, a change in
q does not a⁄ect the degree of informativeness of the semiseparating equilibrium, as measured by
pH ￿ pL.
Figure 3. Information transmission.
20When the probability of facing a high-type leader is su¢ ciently large, i.e., p ￿ pH, the follower and, as a result,
the low-type leader sign the treaty (in pure strategies), i.e., pL = 1, behaving as prescribed in the pooling equilibrium
of the game.
133.1 Special cases: One-sided uncertainty
Our previous results also provide equilibrium predictions in information settings where only one
country is privately informed about its own type, whereas the other country￿ s type is common
knowledge. The following corollary investigates the case in which the follower has a long history of
compliance (or not compliance) with the content of the treaty, while the leader does not, i.e., thus
limiting uncertainty to the leader￿ s type alone.
Corollary 2 (Special case I) In the signaling game where the leader privately observes its
type, while the follower￿ s high type is common knowledge (i.e., q = 1), only the pooling equilibrium
of Proposition 1b and the semiseparating equilibrium of Proposition 2 can be sustained as PBEs of
the game. If, instead, the follower￿ s low type is common knowledge (q = 0), only the separating
equilibrium of Proposition 1a can be supported as a PBE.
First, note that this result implies that when countries are informed about the follower￿ s type
being high, no separating equilibrium in pure strategies can be sustained, thus limiting the potential
of information transmission. As ￿gure 3 above illustrates, when the follower￿ s type is high (i.e.,
q = 1, in the upper dashed horizontal line), only a pooling and a semiseparating PBE can be
sustained. Intuitively, the low-type leader is attracted to participate in the treaty under all values
of p since it anticipates that the follower will either respond signing ￿ as prescribed in the pooling
equilibrium￿ , or randomize its participation decision, as in the semiseparating equilibrium. If, by
contrast, the follower￿ s type is low (i.e., q = 0, along the horizontal axis of ￿gure 3), the leader
anticipates that the follower will respond joining under all parameter conditions, but subsequently
will not implement the content of the treaty. Therefore, only the high-type leader ￿nds bene￿cial
to participate in the treaty with such type of follower since BS1H(￿L) > 0. As a consequence, only
a separating equilibrium where the high-type leader signs the agreement can be supported.
Let us next investigate the implications of our results under the opposite information context:
that arising when the leader￿ s type is common knowledge, whereas the follower privately observes
its type; which we refer as special case II. Unlike the information setting examined in Corollary 2,
this case illustrates strategic contexts where the country leading the negotiations has a long history
of ful￿lling the content of the agreements in which it participates or, on the contrary, systematically
not living up to its promises. The follower is therefore perfectly informed about the leader￿ s type.
Corollary 3 (Special case II) In the signaling game where the follower privately observes
its type, while the leader￿ s high type is common knowledge (i.e., p = 1), only the separating equi-
librium of Proposition 1a and the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 1b can be sustained as PBEs
of the game. If, instead, the leader￿ s low type is common knowledge (p = 0), only the separating
equilibrium of Proposition 1a and the semiseparating equilibrium of Proposition 2 can be supported
as PBEs.
First, note that when the leader￿ s type is high (i.e., p = 1, in the dashed vertical line of ￿gure
3), both types of followers respond joining a treaty with the leader, since the latter will fully
14comply with the content of the agreement. The high-type leader, hence, participates in the treaty.
Similarly, when the leader￿ s type is low (i.e., p = 0, along the vertical axis of the ￿gure), the follower
responds not joining the agreement and, anticipating such a response, the low-type leader does not
sign the treaty either.21
Finally, equilibrium outcomes under complete information (Lemma 1) are also embodied by our
results. In particular, the vertices of the ￿gure depict four possible combinations where: (1) both
leader and follower are high type (p = q = 1) inducing the leader to sign the treaty and the follower
to respond joining; (2) both leader and follower are low type (p = q = 0) and the leader does not
sign the agreement; (3) the leader is a high type but the follower is not (p = 1 and q = 0) inducing
the leader to sign the treaty and the follower to respond joining; and (4) the leader is a low type
but the follower￿ s type is high (p = 0 and q = 1) inducing the leader to not sign the treaty. Hence,
under complete information the agreement is only successful when the leader￿ s type is high (cases
1 and 3), as prescribed in Lemma 1.
4 Welfare comparisons
Let us evaluate the welfare resulting from our previous equilibrium outcomes. We examine the
welfare e⁄ects of increasing the degree of uncertainty, which is graphically represented in ￿gure 3
by a movement from one of the boundaries to an interior point, where (p;q) 2 (0;1).
Proposition 3. Equilibrium welfare satis￿es the following ranking:
1. When the leader￿ s type is high, social welfare in the pooling PBE is weakly larger than under
all other equilibrium outcomes, SWpooling = SWsepar ￿ SWsemisepar, for any follower￿ s type.
2. Similarly, when the leader￿ s type is low but the follower￿ s is high, the pooling PBE yields a
larger welfare than any of the other equilibrium outcomes if the aggregate bene￿ts from signing
the treaty are su¢ ciently high, that is,
V1L(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿L) > V1L(NS;￿H) + V2H(NS;￿L).
3. In contrast, when both countries￿types are low, the pooling PBE produces a lower welfare than
all other equilibrium outcomes, SWsepar > SWsemisepar > SWpooling.
4. Finally, under complete information, social welfare coincides with SWsepar.
Therefore, when the type of at least one of the countries involved in the negotiations is high,
social welfare in the pooling equilibrium, where both types of leader sign and the follower responds
21Interestingly, this result applies to both the separating equilibrium ￿ where the low-type leader does not partici-
pate, as prescribed in Proposition 1a￿ and to the semiseparating equilibrium, where the low-type leader randomizes
with a probability pL which collapses to zero when p = 0, thus yielding the same equilibrium outcome.
15joining, is weakly larger than under any of the other equilibrium outcomes, where either: only
one type of leader participates (as in the separating equilibrium), or the leader randomizes its
participation decision (as in the semiseparating equilibrium).22 In contrast, when both countries￿
types are low, the no signature of the agreement prescribed in the separating equilibrium yields a
larger social welfare. If instead the agreement were successful, countries￿actions would coincide
with those under no treaty but the leader would bear a cost from the unsuccessful treaty, thus
entailing a lower social welfare than under the separating equilibrium.
In addition, in complete information contexts countries behave as prescribed in the separating
equilibrium. When at least one country￿ s type is high, the introduction of incomplete information
yields a social welfare which is not necessarily superior to that under complete information. Specif-
ically, this welfare comparison depends on countries￿priors. When priors are relatively symmetric,
i.e., p ￿ pH and q ￿ qL, the pooling equilibrium arises, generating a larger welfare than under
complete information. By contrast, when priors are relatively asymmetric, i.e., p < pH and q ￿ qL,
the semiseparating equilibrium emerges, entailing a lower social welfare than in complete infor-
mation contexts.23 Finally, when both countries￿types are low, the social welfare under complete
information coincides with that arising in the separating equilibrium, which it is strictly larger than
the welfare under the pooling and semiseparating equilibria of the incomplete information game.
5 Correlated types
Consider a setting where countries￿types are not independent but, instead, exhibit correlation.
When positively correlated, for instance, a country￿ s observation of its high type allows it to infer
that the other country is likely to be a high-type country as well. A converse argument applies to
types that are negatively correlated. More precisely, let the J-type follower assign a conditional
probability pJ(p) to the leader￿ s type being high, and 1 ￿ pJ(p) to its type being low. Similarly,
the K-type leader assigns a conditional probability qK(q) to the follower being a high type, and
1 ￿ qK(q) to the follower being low. Note that when priors are uncorrelated (as in previous sec-
tions), conditional probabilities satisfy pH(p) = pL(p) = p and qH(p) = qL(p) = q, and therefore, a
country￿ s private observation of its type does not provide additional information about the other
country￿ s type. In contrast, when types are positively correlated, conditional probabilities satisfy
pH(p) > p > pL(p) and qH(q) > q > qL(q). Positively correlated types describe settings where the
countries involved in the negotiations, despite being uncertain about each others￿types, share sim-
ilar institutional contexts, history, etc., which suggests that countries￿types are likely to coincide.
A converse argument is applicable when priors are negatively correlated, where pH(p) < p < pL(p)
22When the leader￿ s type is low but the follower￿ s is high, the semiseparating equilibrium yields a larger welfare
than the separating PBE if the aggregate bene￿ts from signing the treaty are su¢ ciently high. In such case, the
complete welfare ranking is SWpooling > SWsemisepar > SWsepar. For more details, see proof of Proposition 3 in the
appendix.
23Note that when priors satisfy p < pH and q < qL (or when p ￿ pH and q < qL), a separating equilibrium
arises where social welfare coincides with that under complete information. We hence focus on the regions of prior
probabilities for which pooling or semiseparating equilibria emerge.
16and qH(q) < q < qL(q). The next proposition analyzes how our previous equilibrium predictions
are a⁄ected by the presence of correlation on players￿types.
Proposition 4. The pooling PBE of Proposition 1b and the semiseparating PBE of Proposition
2 can be supported under a more restrictive set of priors q when types are positively correlated than
otherwise. In contrast, the separating PBE of Proposition 1a can be sustained under a larger set
of priors q when types are positively correlated than otherwise. The converse result applies when
countries￿types are negatively correlated.
The above proposition describes the e⁄ects of positive correlation on the pooling equilibrium,
where the low-type leader signs under a more restrictive set of priors q. In particular, under
uncorrelated types, the low-type leader participates in the treaty only when the probability of
facing a high-type follower is su¢ ciently large. Under positively correlated types, this leader infers
that the follower￿ s type is likely to be low as well, and thus becomes more ￿hesitant￿to participate,
i.e., signs for a more restricted set of parameter values, ultimately shrinking the set of priors under
which the pooling PBE can be sustained. The semiseparating PBE can be similarly supported under
more restrictive priors. Intuitively, the low-type leader is less willing to randomize its participation
decision under correlated types, given that it is more ￿certain￿that the follower must also be low.
In contrast, the separating equilibrium can be sustained under larger conditions. Speci￿cally,
when countries￿ types are uncorrelated, the low-type leader refrains from signing the treaty if
the probability of facing a high-type follower is su¢ ciently low. When types are correlated, its
privately observed low type informs the leader that the follower is likely a low-type country as
well, thereby enlarging the set of priors under which the low-type leader does not participate in the
treaty, as prescribed in the separating PBE. Hence, the presence of positive correlation facilitates
the emergence of informative equilibria, where the leader￿ s signature decision conveys information
about its type to the follower, while it hinders the existence of uninformative equilibria (such as
the pooling and semiseparating equilibria), whereby information is concealed from the follower.
Finally, when countries￿types are negatively correlated, the low-type leader infers that the
follower is likely a high-type country, inducing the leader to participate in the agreement under
larger parameter conditions, both in the pooling and separating equilibria. Conversely, the low-
type leader is attracted to participate in the separating equilibrium under a more restrictive set of
priors, thus shrinking the region of parameter values supporting this equilibrium.
Policy implications. From a policy perspective, the results of the paper suggest that nego-
tiations under incomplete information should favor contexts in which one of the countries has a
relatively long history of complying with similar agreements. In addition, rather than promoting
negotiations between countries with similar domestic constraints and institutions, our equilibrium
predictions indicate that international organizations should actually support treaties where coun-
tries di⁄er in their political ability to comply with the content of the agreement. Finally, the
promotion of treaties where countries￿previous compliance history is relatively similar (i.e., sym-
metric priors) would yield welfare-improving outcomes.
176 Conclusions
Our paper examines bilateral negotiations in a setting where all parties are uninformed about
each others￿ability to comply with the terms of the agreement. We identify parameter conditions
under which either a separating, a pooling or a semiseparating equilibrium exists. The paper
also investigates under which conditions information transmission is promoted by changes in the
probability that the leader or follower￿ s type is high. Under incomplete information, we demonstrate
that the pooling equilibrium yields a larger social welfare than any other equilibrium outcome if
at least one country is highly committed with the terms of the treaty. We then examine the
welfare properties of our equilibrium results, showing that the presence of incomplete information
provides more cases for which the treaty becomes successful, entailing a welfare improvement if,
in addition, countries￿priors are relatively symmetric. Finally, we extend our analysis to settings
where countries￿types are positively correlated, ￿nding that the separating equilibrium can be
supported under larger conditions, whereas the pooling and semiseparating equilibria are sustained
under a more restrictive set of parameter values.
The model describes a context where countries interact only once. However, an enlarged setting
could consider a repeated game structure, where signatory countries renegotiate the terms of the
agreement or interact in the negotiation of new treaties. In such a context, countries￿beliefs not
only depend on the signature decisions but also on the compliance history of their cosignatories.
Hence, a country￿ s current ful￿llment of the agreement would be determined by its political ability
to comply, as in our model, and by the future reputational consequences that such compliance
entails. In addition, the paper considers that the domestic political situation is una⁄ected by
the signature and posterior implementation of the agreement. However, a di⁄erent setting could
capture the e⁄ect of these decisions into a country￿ s political situation (e.g., a⁄ecting the likelihood
that the incumbent party is reelected) thus modifying the parameter conditions under which our
equilibrium outcomes can be supported.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
By backward induction, let us ￿rst analyze the follower￿ s strategy. When it observes a treaty
signed by a high-type leader, both types of follower respond signing since BS2H(￿H) > 0 when the
follower￿ s type is high and BS2L(￿H) > 0 when its type is low. However, if the follower observes
a low-type leader signing, it responds not joining the treaty regardless of its type, provided that
BS2H(￿L) < 0 and BS2L(￿L) = 0.
Given the follower￿ s strategy, the high-type leader anticipates that its signature will be re-
sponded with a signature, regardless of the follower￿ s type. Hence, it signs the treaty since the
bene￿ts from signing satisfy BS1H(￿H) > BS1H(￿L) > 0. When the leader￿ s type is low, however,
18the leader anticipates that the follower will respond not signing the agreement, regardless of its
type, yielding V1L(S;NS;￿J) for J = fH;Lg. Thus, the leader does not participate since by not
signing it avoids the cost from an unsuccessful treaty, i.e., V1L(NS;￿J) > V1L(S;NS;￿J). ￿
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Separating equilibrium. Let us ￿rst show that the separating strategy pro￿le in which the leader
chooses to sign (not sign) the IEA when its type is high (low, respectively) can be supported as a
PBE of the signaling game. Under such strategy pro￿le, the J-type follower￿ s beliefs are updated
according to Bayes￿rule and become ￿J(HjS) = 1 and ￿J(HjNS) = 0 after observing a signature
(not signature, respectively) from the leader, where J = fH;Lg. Given these posterior beliefs, the
high-type follower signs the agreement since V2H(S;S;￿H) > V2H(S;NS;￿H), and similarly for the
low-type follower where V2L(S;S;￿H) > V2L(S;NS;￿H). As a consequence, the high-type leader
chooses to participate in the treaty since V1H(S;S;￿J) > V1H(NS;￿J) for all J-type follower, i.e.,
signing is a strictly dominant strategy for the high-type leader. In addition, the low-type leader
does not participate (as prescribed in this separating equilibrium) if
q ￿ V1L(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ q) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿L) < q ￿ V1L(NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ q) ￿ V1L(NS;￿L), or
q <
￿BS1L (￿L)
BS1L (￿H) ￿ BS1L (￿L)
￿ qL
where BS1L (￿J) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿J) ￿ V1L(NS;￿J) denotes the low-type leader￿ s bene￿t of signing an
agreement with a J-type follower. Note that cuto⁄ qL > 0 since BS1L (￿L) < 0 and qL < 1
2 given
that BS1L (￿H) > 0 and BS1L (￿H) > BS1L (￿L). Hence, the low-type leader does not participate
if q < qL. Therefore, the above separating strategy pro￿le can be sustained as a PBE of the game
if q < qL.
Pooling equilibrium with signature. Let us next demonstrate that the pooling strategy
pro￿le, in which the leader signs the treaty regardless of its type, can be part of a PBE under
certain conditions. In this strategy, the J-type follower￿ s posterior beliefs cannot be updated
and thus coincide with its priors, i.e., ￿J(HjS) = p and ￿J(LjS) = 1 ￿ p. (Note that o⁄-the-
equilibrium beliefs do not play a role in this pooling equilibrium. In particular, after observing the
o⁄-the-equilibrium action of ￿no signature￿the follower has, by de￿nition, an empty action space.
Therefore, o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs cannot a⁄ect the follower￿ s response and, as a consequence,
do not a⁄ect the leader￿ s decision either.)
Given these beliefs, the high-type follower chooses to not sign the agreement if
p ￿ V2H(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V2H(S;S;￿L) < p ￿ V2H(S;NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V2H(S;NS;￿L), or
p <
￿BS2H (￿L)
BS2H (￿H) ￿ BS2H (￿L)
￿ pH
where BS2H (￿K) ￿ V2H(S;S;￿K) ￿ V2H(S;NS;￿K) denotes the high-type follower￿ s bene￿t from
19signing an agreement with a K-type leader. Note that pH > 0 since the follower￿ s payo⁄s sat-
isfy BS2H (￿L) < 0 and BS2H (￿H) > BS2H (￿L) by de￿nition. In addition, pH < 1
2 given that
BS2H (￿H) ￿ BS2H (￿L) > ￿BS2H (￿L) or BS2H (￿H) > 0. Hence, when p < pH, the high-type
follower does not sign the treaty, and signs otherwise. Similarly, the low-type follower does not sign
the agreement if
p ￿ V2L(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V2L(S;S;￿L) < p ￿ V2L(S;NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V2L(S;NS;￿L), or
p <
￿BS2L (￿L)
BS2L (￿H) ￿ BS2L (￿L)
￿ pL
where BS2L (￿K) ￿ V2L(S;S;￿K) ￿ V2L(S;NS;￿K) denotes the low-type follower￿ s bene￿t from
signing an agreement with a K-type leader. Since BS2L (￿L) = 0 by de￿nition, pL = 0, implying
that the low-type follower signs for all parameter values. Let us next analyze equilibrium strategies
for the leader.
1. High priors, p ￿ pH. In this case both types of follower respond signing the treaty. The high-
type leader participates in the agreement since V1H(S;S;￿K) > V1H(NS;￿K) for all follower
K. However, the low-type leader signs if
qV1L(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ qV1L(NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1L(NS;￿L), or
q ￿
￿BS1L (￿L)
BS1L (￿H) ￿ BS1L (￿L)
￿ qL
where qL 2 (0;1) from our above discussion in the separating equilibrium. Therefore, the
pooling strategy pro￿le in which both types of leader sign the agreement can be sustained if
p ￿ pH and q ￿ qL.
2. Low priors, p < pH. In this case the high-type follower responds not participating in the treaty
while the low-type follower signs for all parameter values. The high-type leader participates in
the agreement for all priors q since V1H(S;NS;￿H) > V1H(NS;￿H) when facing a high-type
follower and V1H(S;S;￿L) > V1H(NS;￿L) when facing a low-type follower. Regarding the
low-type leader, he signs the treaty if
qV1L(S;NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ qV1L(NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1L(NS;￿L), or
q ￿
￿BS1L (￿L)
[V1L(S;NS;￿H) ￿ V1L(NS;￿H)] ￿ BS1L (￿L)
￿ q0
L
where BS1L (￿L) < 0 by de￿nition. In addition, V1L(S;NS;￿H) < V1L(NS;￿H) since the
agreement is not successful. Hence, cuto⁄ q0
L > 1 and the low-type leader does not sign the
agreement for any prior q. Therefore, the pooling strategy pro￿le in which both types of
leader sign the treaty cannot be sustained as PBE when p < pH.
Pooling equilibrium with no signature. Finally, let us show that the pooling strategy
20pro￿le where the leader does not sign the agreement regardless of its type cannot be sustained as
part of a PBE. First, note that the follower￿ s posterior beliefs cannot be updated using Bayes￿rule,
and hence must be arbitrarily speci￿ed, ￿J(HjS) 2 [0;1] for any J-type follower, where J = fH;Lg.
Given these beliefs, the high-type follower signs the agreement if and only if
￿H(HjS) ￿ V2H(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿H(HjS)) ￿ V2H(S;S;￿L)
￿ ￿H(HjS) ￿ V2H(S;NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿H(HjS)) ￿ V2H(S;NS;￿L), or
￿H(HjS) ￿
￿BS2H (￿L)
BS2H (￿H) ￿ BS2H (￿L)
￿ pH
where pH 2 (0;1) from our above discussion. Regarding the low-type follower, it participates in
the treaty if
￿L(HjS) ￿ V2L(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿L(HjS)) ￿ V2L(S;S;￿L)
￿ ￿L(HjS) ￿ V2L(S;NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿L(HjS)) ￿ V2L(S;NS;￿L), or
￿L(HjS) ￿
￿BS2L (￿L)
BS2L (￿H) ￿ BS2L (￿L)
￿ pL
where pL = 0 from our above discussion. Hence, the low-type follower signs the agreement for all
o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs ￿L(HjS). Let us now analyze the leader￿ s strategy.
1. If ￿H(HjS) ￿ pH, both the high and low-type follower respond signing. If the leader is a
high type country, it signs the agreement since V1H(S;S;￿J) > V1H(NS;￿J) for any J-type
of follower. Hence, the high-type leader signs the treaty under all priors q and the pooling
strategy pro￿le in which no leader signs cannot be supported as PBE for the case in which
o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs satisfy ￿H(HjS) ￿ pH.
2. If ￿H(HjS) < pH, the high-type follower responds not signing whereas the low-type re-
sponds signing. If the leader is a high type country, it participates in the agreement since
V1H(S;NS;￿H) > V1H(NS;￿H) when facing a high-type follower and V1H(S;S;￿L) > V1H(NS;￿L)
when facing a low-type follower. The pooling strategy pro￿le in which both types of leader do
not sign the treaty cannot sustained as a PBE of the game when o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs
satisfy ￿H(HjS) < pH.
Intuitive Criterion. Let us apply the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion for the pooling
PBE where p ￿ pH and q ￿ qL. We ￿rst check if a deviation towards ￿not sign￿is equilibrium
dominated for either type of leader. When the leader is a high type country, the highest payo⁄
that it obtains by deviating towards ￿not sign￿ is qV1H(NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1H(NS;￿L), which
does exceed its equilibrium payo⁄, qV1H(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1H(S;S;￿L), since V1H(S;S;￿J) >
V1H(NS;￿J) for any J-type follower. Regarding the low-type leader, the highest payo⁄ that it can
obtain by deviating is qV1L(NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1L(NS;￿L) which exceeds its equilibrium payo⁄ of
21qV1L(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1L(S;S;￿L) if
qV1L(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1L(S;S;￿L) < qV1L(NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ q)V1L(NS;￿L), or q < qL
where cuto⁄ qL 2 (0;1) from our above discussion in the separating equilibrium. Hence, the low-
type leader deviates towards ￿not sign￿if q < qL. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium in which both
types of leader do not participate in the treaty (supported under p ￿ pH and q ￿ qL) survives the
Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion. ￿
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us ￿rst analyze the strategy for the high-type follower. (The low-type follower signs the agree-
ment for all priors p, and therefore it does not modify its signature decision based on the information
inferred from the leader￿ s randomization).The high-type follower must be mixing. Otherwise, the
leader could anticipate its action and play pure strategies as in any of the strategy pro￿les described
in proposition 2, which are not PBE of the signaling game when p < pH and q ￿ qL. Hence, the
high-type follower must be indi⁄erent between signing and not signing the treaty, that is,
￿2H(HjS) ￿ V2H(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿2H(HjS)) ￿ V2H(S;S;￿L)
= ￿2H(HjS) ￿ V2H(S;NS;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿2H(HjS)) ￿ V2H(S;NS;￿L),
or ￿2H(HjS) = pH. We can next use the follower￿ s posterior beliefs in order to ￿nd the probability
with which the leader randomizes when its type is low, pL, by using Bayes￿rule.
￿H(HjS) = pH =
(1 ￿ p) ￿ pL
((1 ￿ p) ￿ pL) + (p ￿ pH)




1￿pH, which is positive, pL > 0, since p;pH 2
(0;1). In addition, note that pL < 1 holds for all priors p satisfying p < 1￿pH. Since jBS2H(￿H)j >
jBS2H(￿L)j by de￿nition, cuto⁄pH satis￿es pH < 1=2, which implies p < 1￿pH holds for all priors,
because p < pH by assumption. Note that probability pL increases in p.
Finally, if the low-type leader mixes with probability pL 2 (0;1), it must be that the high-type
follower makes this leader indi⁄erent between signing and not signing the agreement (the low-type
follower responds by signing under all parameter conditions). Using rH(q) to denote the probability
with which the high-type follower mixes between signing and not signing the treaty, the low-type
leader is indi⁄erent if
q [rH(q) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿H) + (1 ￿ rH(q)) ￿ V1L(S;NS;￿H)] + (1 ￿ q)V1L(S;S;￿L)









22where BPS1L(￿J) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿J) ￿ V1L(S;NS;￿J) denotes the bene￿ts that the low-type leader
obtains from the posterior signature of the agreement by the J-type follower. On the other hand,
CUT1L(￿J) ￿ V1L(NS;￿J)￿V1L(S;NS;￿J) represents the low-type leader￿ s cost from an unsuccess-
ful treaty. It is easy to show that this leader￿ s bene￿t from signing the treaty, BS1L(￿J), can there-
fore be expressed as the sum of the above two bene￿ts, i.e., BS1L(￿J) = BPS1L(￿J)￿CUT1L(￿J),
where J = fH;Lg. In addition, note that the probability rH(q) satis￿es rH(q) 2 (0;1). Indeed,
CUT1L(￿H) +
1￿q




￿BS1L(￿L), which can be rearranged
as qL ￿
￿BS1L(￿L)
BS1L(￿H)￿BS1L(￿L) < q, which holds by assumption. Finally, note that probability rH(q) is
decreasing in q. ￿
7.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Follower￿ s type is high. When q = 1, then condition q < qL does not hold, and thus the separat-
ing equilibrium of Proposition 1a cannot be sustained. The pooling equilibrium of Proposition 1b,
however, can be supported if the prior probability p satis￿es condition p ￿ pH. The semiseparating
equilibrium of Proposition 2 can be sustained (since q = 1 ￿ qL holds) if, in addition, prior p sat-





(pH = 1, respectively), which is una⁄ected by the value of q, given that pH is independent on q.
The high-type follower responds joining the treaty with probability rH(q), which decreases in q,
becoming rH(1) =
CUT1L(￿H)
BPS1L(￿H) when q = 1; whereas the low-type follower responds signing with
probability one, irrespective of the value of q.
Follower￿ s type is low. When q = 0, then condition q < qL is satis￿ed, and the separating
equilibrium of Proposition 1a can be sustained. The pooling equilibrium of Proposition 1b, however,
cannot be supported since q ￿ qL is not satis￿ed when q = 0. The semiseparating equilibrium of
Proposition 2 cannot be sustained either since condition q ￿ qL does not hold. ￿
7.5 Proof of Corollary 3
Leader￿ s type is high. When p = 1, then condition q < qL holds, and thus the separating
equilibrium of Proposition 1a can be sustained. Similarly, the pooling equilibrium of Proposition
1b can be supported since condition p ￿ pH holds when p = 1. The semiseparating equilibrium of
Proposition 2, however, cannot be sustained since condition p < pH is not satis￿ed when p = 1.
Follower￿ s type is low. When p = 0, condition q < qL is satis￿ed, and therefore the
separating equilibrium of Proposition 1a can be sustained. The pooling equilibrium of Proposition
1b, however, cannot be supported since condition p ￿ pH is not satis￿ed when p = 0. Finally, the
semiseparating equilibrium of Proposition 2 can be sustained since condition p < pH holds when





to pL = 0 when p = 0, i.e., the low-type leader does not participate in the treaty in pure strategies.
The high-type leader, by contrast, signs with probability pH = 1, which is independent on p. Let us







BPS1L(￿H) which does not depend upon the prior p. Similarly, the low-type
follower responds singing with probability rL = 1, irrespective of the value of p. ￿
7.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Separating PBE. When the leader￿ s type is high, it participates in the agreement and the fol-
lower responds joining, yielding a social welfare (summing up the equilibrium payo⁄s of leader
and follower) of V1H(S;S;￿J) + V2J(S;S;￿H) where J = fH;Lg denotes the follower￿ s type. If,
in contrast, the leader￿ s type is low, the leader does not sign the treaty, entailing a welfare of
V1L(NS;￿J) + V2J(NS;￿L).
Pooling PBE. The pooling PBE yields a social welfare of V1K(S;S;￿J) + V2J(S;S;￿K), where
K = fH;Lg denotes the leader￿ s type and J = fH;Lg represents the follower￿ s type, which
entails the same social welfare as in the separating PBE when the leader￿ s type is high, i.e.,
SWsepar = SWpooling, for any follower￿ s type J. However, when the leader￿ s type is low, the
separating equilibrium prescribes that this leader does not participate in the treaty, yielding a so-
cial welfare of V1L(NS;￿J) + V2J(NS;￿L), which lies weakly below that under the pooling PBE
if
V1L(NS;￿J) + V2J(NS;￿L) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿J) + V2J(S;S;￿L)
or alternatively, ￿BS2J(￿L) ￿ BS1L(￿J), where BS1L(￿J) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿J) ￿ V1L(NS;￿J) denotes
the low-type leader￿ s bene￿t from signing an agreement with a J-type follower, and conversely
BS2L(￿J) ￿ V2J(S;S;￿L) ￿ V2J(S;NS;￿L) represents the J-type follower￿ s bene￿t from signing a
treaty with a low-type leader, since V2J(NS;￿L) = V2J(S;NS;￿L). Let us separately analyze the
cases in which the follower￿ s type is high and low.
1. If the leader￿ s type is low while that of the follower is high, i.e., J = H, then BS1L(￿H) > 0 for
the leader and BS2H(￿L) < 0 for the follower and, as a consequence, condition ￿BS2H(￿L) ￿
BS1L(￿H) holds if
V1L(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿L) > V1L(NS;￿H) + V2H(NS;￿L)
which represents that the aggregated bene￿ts from signing the treaty are su¢ ciently high,
implying that SWsepar < SWpooling. Otherwise, ￿BS2H(￿L) > BS1L(￿H), and the separating
equilibrium yields a larger social welfare than the pooling equilibrium.
2. When the leader￿ s and follower￿ s type are low, i.e., J = L, the bene￿ts from signing an agree-
ment between two low-type countries are BS1L(￿L) < 0 for the leader and BS2L(￿L) = 0 for
the follower. Therefore, when both leader and follower are low types, condition ￿BS2J(￿L) ￿
BS1L(￿J) does not hold, and hence social welfare in the separating equilibrium is larger than
under the pooling equilibrium, i.e., SWsepar > SWpooling.
24Semiseparating PBE. Let us now evaluate social welfare in the semiseparating equilibrium.
1. When both the leader and follower￿ s types are high, the former participates with probability
one while the latter randomizes according to probability rH(q). Hence, social welfare becomes
rH(q) ￿ [V1H(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿H)] + (1 ￿ rH(q)) ￿ [V1H(S;NS;￿H) + V2H(S;NS;￿H)]
where the ￿rst term in brackets, V1H(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿H), is larger than the second,
V1H(S;NS;￿H) + V2H(S;NS;￿H), since V1H(S;S;￿H) > V1H(S;NS;￿H) for the leader and
similarly V2H(S;S;￿H) > V2H(S;NS;￿H) for the follower, since BS2H(￿H) > 0. Furthermore,
recall that social welfare under the pooling PBE is V1H(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿H). Hence,
welfare in the semiseparating equilibrium is a linear combination between the social welfare
in the pooling PBE and a smaller number, thereby yielding a lower welfare than under
the pooling PBE. Combining this result with that from the pooling PBE, we obtain that
SWsepar = SWpooling > SWsemisepar.
2. When the leader￿ s type is high but the follower￿ s is low, this equilibrium prescribes that
both countries sign the agreement with probability one, thus yielding a social welfare of
V1H(S;S;￿L) + V2L(S;S;￿H), which coincides with that under the pooling equilibrium of
Proposition 1b. Combining this result with that from the pooling PBE, we obtain that
SWsepar = SWpooling = SWsemisepar.
3. Finally, when leader￿ s type is low and that of the follower is high, both countries randomize
their participation decision, yielding social welfare of
pL [rH(q)[V1L(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿L)] + (1 ￿ rH(q))[V1L(S;NS;￿H) + V2H(S;NS;￿L)]]
+(1 ￿ pL)[V1L(NS;￿H) + V2H(NS;￿L)]:
whereas social welfare under the pooling PBE is V1L(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿L), which we
denote as A. Hence, the social welfare in the semiseparating equilibrium is lower than under
pooling PBE if
pL [rH(q)A + (1 ￿ rH(q))[V1L(S;NS;￿H) + V2H(S;NS;￿L)]]
+(1 ￿ pL)[V1L(NS;￿H) + V2H(NS;￿L)] < A
rearranging, using the property that V2H(S;NS;￿L) = V2H(NS;￿L) = X, and solving for the
payo⁄ A, we obtain
A ￿
￿pLCUT1L(￿H) + B ￿ pLrH(q)[V1L(S;NS;￿H) + X]
1 ￿ pLrH(q)
< A
where CUT1L(￿H) ￿ V1L(NS;￿H) ￿ V1L(S;NS;￿H), and B ￿ V1L(NS;￿H) + V2H(NS;￿L).
Cuto⁄ A lies below B, which implies that A > B is a su¢ cient condition for A > A, entailing
25that welfare in the pooling equilibrium exceeds that in the semiseparating equilibrium. In
particular, A < B since




+ [V1L(S;NS;￿H) + X] > B
Using B ￿ V1L(NS;￿H) + V2H(NS;￿L) = V1L(NS;￿H) + X, since V2H(NS;￿L) = X, the
above inequality can be simpli￿ed to CUT1L(￿H) > rH(q)CUT1L(￿H), which holds by as-
sumption given that rH(q) 2 (0;1). Concluding, condition A > B, or alternatively,
V1L(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿L) > V1L(NS;￿H) + V2H(NS;￿L)
guarantees that welfare in the pooling equilibrium exceeds that in the semiseparating equi-
librium.
￿ Finally, in order to obtain a complete welfare ranking, let us now compare welfare under
the separating and semiseparating equilibrium when the leader￿ s type is low and the
follower￿ s is high. In the separating PBE, social welfare is V1L(NS;￿H)+V2H(NS;￿L) ￿
B. The semiseparating PBE yields a welfare of
pL [rH(q)A + (1 ￿ rH(q))[V1L(S;NS;￿H) + X]] + (1 ￿ pL)[V1L(NS;￿H) + X];
which is larger than in the separating equilibrium, B, if
A >
pLCUT1L(￿H) ￿ (1 ￿ pL)V1L(S;NS;￿H) + rH(q)[V1L(S;NS;￿H) + X]
pLrH(q)
￿ e A
Hence, if A > e A (i.e., the bene￿ts from signing the agreement are su¢ ciently high) we
obtain the complete welfare ranking SWpooling > SWsemisepar > SWsepar. If, instead,
A ￿ e A, the welfare ranking becomes SWpooling > SWsepar > SWsemisepar.
4. When, in contrast, both the leader and follower￿ s types are low, the former randomizes ac-




1￿pH, whereas the follower responds joining the treaty with
probability one. Therefore, social welfare in this case is
pL ￿ [V1L(S;S;￿L) + V2L(S;S;￿L)] + (1 ￿ pL) ￿ [V1L(NS;￿L) + V2L(NS;￿L)]:
which can be alternatively expressed as
pL￿[V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ V1L(NS;￿L)]+pL￿[V2L(S;S;￿L) ￿ V2L(NS;￿L)]+V1L(NS;￿L)+V2L(NS;￿L):
26where the ￿rst term in brackets is negative since V1L(S;S;￿L) < V1L(NS;￿L) for the leader,
given that BS1L(￿L) < 0 by assumption. The second term is zero because V2L(S;S;￿L) =
V2L(NS;￿L) for the follower, since BS2L(￿L) = 0 given that V2L(NS;￿L) = V2L(S;NS;￿L).
Therefore, welfare under the semiseparating equilibrium becomes
pL ￿ [V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ V1L(NS;￿L)] + V1L(NS;￿L) + V2L(NS;￿L):
which lies above the welfare under the pooling PBE, V1L(S;S;￿L) + V2L(S;S;￿L), if
pL￿[V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ V1L(NS;￿L)]+V1L(NS;￿L)+V2L(NS;￿L) > V1L(S;S;￿L)+V2L(S;S;￿L)
and since V2L(S;S;￿L) = V2L(NS;￿L) for the follower, the above condition can be expressed
as
pL ￿ [V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ V1L(NS;￿L)] + V1L(NS;￿L) > V1L(S;S;￿L)
and rearranging, we obtain V1L(NS;￿L) > V1L(S;S;￿L), a condition that holds by assump-
tion.
￿ Finally, in order to obtain a complete welfare ranking, let us now compare social welfare
under the separating and semiseparating equilibrium. In the separating PBE, social
welfare is V1L(NS;￿L)+V2L(NS;￿L); whereas in the semiseparating PBE social welfare
is
pL ￿ [V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ V1L(NS;￿L)] + V1L(NS;￿L) + V2L(NS;￿L):
which lies below the welfare under the separating PBE, V1L(NS;￿L) + V2L(NS;￿L), if
pL￿[V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ V1L(NS;￿L)]+V1L(NS;￿L)+V2L(NS;￿L) < V1L(NS;￿L)+V2L(NS;￿L)
and rearranging pL [V1L(S;S;￿L) ￿ V1L(NS;￿L)] < 0, which holds by assumption given
that V1L(S;S;￿L) < V1L(NS;￿L) when both countries￿types are low.
￿ Therefore, social welfare in the semiseparating PBE is lower than in the separating
equilibrium, yielding a complete ranking of SWsepar > SWsemisepar > SWpooling.
Complete information. Let us ￿rst compare social welfare when both countries￿types are high.
Under complete information, social welfare is SWHH
complete ￿ V1H(S;S;￿H) + V2H(S;S;￿H), which
coincides with equilibrium welfare under the pooling and separating PBE. Regarding the case where
the leader￿ s type is high but the follower￿ s is low, SWHL
complete ￿ V1H(S;S;￿L) + V2L(S;S;￿H) also
coincides with that under the pooling and separating equilibrium. When the leader￿ s type is low
but the follower￿ s is high, SWLH
complete ￿ V1L(NS;￿H)+V2H(NS;￿L), which coincides with the social
welfare under the separating equilibrium, and hence, lies weakly below that under the pooling PBE
if
V1L(NS;￿J) + V2J(NS;￿L) ￿ V1L(S;S;￿J) + V2J(S;S;￿L).
27Finally, when both countries￿types are low, SWLL
complete ￿ V1L(NS;￿L) + V2L(NS;￿L), which
coincides with social welfare under the separating equilibrium, and therefore, lies above that under
the pooling PBE. ￿
7.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Pooling PBE. When countries￿types are uncorrelated, the pooling PBE can be sustained if the
high-type follower￿ s priors p satisfy p ￿ pH. When types are positively correlated, the high-type
follower￿ s conditional probability that the leader￿ s type is also high becomes
prob(l = Hjf = H) =






where l (f) denotes the leader (follower, respectively). In addition, given positive correlation,
qH(q) > q > qL(q), which implies pH(p) > p; as depicted in ￿gure A1 below. In particular, note
that for the set of priors p under which the pooling PBE emerges under uncorrelated types, i.e.,
p ￿ pH, condition pH(p) ￿ pH holds. Therefore, condition pH(p) ￿ pH can be sustained under a
larger set of priors p than condition p ￿ pH, and the pooling PBE can hence be supported under
a larger set of priors p when countries￿types are positively correlated than otherwise.
Figure A1
28Let us now examine the leader￿ s incentives. Speci￿cally, the low-type leader participates in
the treaty if q ￿ qL under uncorrelated types. When types are correlated, the low-type leader
constructs the conditional probability that the follower is a high type, as follows,
prob(f = Hjl = L) =











Hence, qL(q) < q; as illustrated in ￿gure A2 below. Furthermore, note that condition q ￿ qL can
be sustained under a larger set of priors q than condition qL(q) ￿ qL. Hence, the pooling PBE
can be supported under a more restricted set of priors q when types are correlated than otherwise.
When countries￿types are negatively correlated, qH(q) < q < qL(q), inducing the low-type leader
to sign the agreement under a larger set of priors q, thus expanding the set of priors q for which
the pooling PBE can be supported.
Figure A2
Separating PBE. Let us now analyze the separating PBE which, under uncorrelated types, can
be sustained for all priors q satisfying q < qL. From our above discussion, note that q < qL can be
supported under a more restrictive set of priors q than condition qL(q) < qL; as depicted in ￿gure
A2. Hence, the separating PBE can be sustained under a larger set of priors q when types are
29positively correlated than otherwise. In contrast, when countries￿types are negatively correlated,
pH(p) < p < pL(p) and qH(q) < q < qL(q), inducing the low-type leader to participate under a
larger set of priors q, thus shrinking the set of priors q for which the separating equilibrium can be
sustained.
Semiseparating PBE. From our previous discussion, we can conclude that: (1) the set of priors
q satisfying q ￿ qL under uncorrelated types is larger than that satisfying qL(q) ￿ qL, thereby
restricting the set of priors q for which the semiseparating equilibrium can be supported when
types are correlated; and (2) the set of priors p satisfying p ￿ pH under uncorrelated types is more
restrictive than that satisfying pH(p) ￿ pH, thus expanding the set of priors p for which the semi-
separating PBE can be sustained under correlated types. However, since the set of priors q under
which the leader signs is more restrictive when types are positively correlated, the semiseparating
PBE can be sustained under a more restrictive set of priors q. When countries￿types are negatively
correlated, qH(q) < q < qL(q), inducing the low-type leader to participate under a larger set of
priors q, thus expanding the set of priors q for which the semiseparating PBE can be sustained. ￿
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